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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to build a constructive quantificational semantics for logical modalities.
To achieve this goal, two major problems have to be solved: first, how to include varying domains
of quantification in the semantics without being driven to conceptual difficulties, and second, how to
represent constructively the totality of logically possible worlds.
The problem of representing logically possible worlds—classically or constructively—is linked to
the first problem mentioned above because logically possible worlds presumably have domains of
different cardinalities. It is also argued that the constructive representation of infinite worlds calls for
varying domains.
On the other hand, the solution to the problem of varying domains is best formalized in a con-
structive theory with proof-objects, like Martin-Löf’s type theory. To enable this, one should be able
to give a constructive interpretation for the totality of logically possible worlds.
The conceptual background of the paper is Carnap’s state description semantics, which is given a
new interpretation in Martin-Löf’s nonstandard type theory.
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1. Introduction
What are the possible worlds? In this paper, I will discuss the problem of defining the
logically possible worlds mainly from the point of view of constructive (intuitionistic)
logic. Representing the worlds with possibly non-deterministic choice sequences will pro-
vide us with a solution to dealing with empirical propositions in the context of constructive
logic.
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This article also explores quantifying in modal contexts. The two main themes of the
paper are closely interconnected. If the totality of worlds is defined using a single domain
of individuals, quantification in modal contexts does not present any difficulties. On the
other hand, if there is a need for varying domains in the totality of worlds, problems arise
when an individual does not exist in some world where a sentence that attributes properties
to it should be evaluated.
In the final section of the paper, a constructive possible worlds semantics CS, which is
a formalization of quantified modal logic, is presented. The semantics represents the con-
cepts of satisfiability and validity of ordinary first-order logic with corresponding modal
operators in a way that enables a new kind of interpretation for quantification in modal
contexts.
The historical and conceptual starting point of my approach is Rudolf Carnap’s state
description semantics, where collections of atomic sentences and their negations represent
possible worlds. The framework theory for CS is Martin-Löf’s nonstandard type theory.
Using a ready-made formalism gives several advantages, as presented in Section 7. At this
point, one might ask that if the logical modalities are formalized within a formal framework
(i.e., using the framework as meta-language), how does one explicate the logical modalities
for the propositions of that framework. In other words: what does it mean to say that
a proposition of Martin-Löf’s nonstandard type theory is logically possible or logically
necessary, and how can one define the corresponding modal operators?
Since CS is a subcalculus of Martin-Löf’s nonstandard type theory, the expressions of
CS are instances of more general forms of logical constants. The problem of explicat-
ing logical modalities for type theory is thus approached here by explicating them for a
subcalculus of it.
It is not claimed that CS captures modal concepts in any absolute or metaphysical sense.
Modalities are about expressions of some formal language. They are tied to the expressive
power of the particular language for which they are defined. Although it is natural to ask for
the general conceptions of logical possibility and necessity for Martin-Löf’s nonstandard
type theory, explicating them would provide us with modal notions in some absolute sense
only if it was believed that type theory is a one-to-one picture of a language-independent
reality.
2. The domain of quantification, logical truth and constructive logic: an overview
The difficulty in defining the totality of all logically possible worlds does not arise only
in constructive logic but is of more general character. A world with a given cardinality of
individuals should presumably exist in the set of possible worlds. But then, as Hintikka [8,
p. 93] puts it, “allowing arbitrary high cardinalities in the domains of the alternatives to a
given w0 amounts to considering the class of all cardinalities as a set, and hence is bound
to lead to paradoxes”. At least one such paradox is closely related to Cantor’s paradox.
Consider the set of all cardinalities. The cardinality of the power set of this set should be
among its members. But since the power set of a set is always of greater cardinality than
the set itself, the set itself cannot contain all cardinalities up to the cardinality of the power
set, and hence, cannot contain all cardinalities.
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A solution to this problem is to impose a restriction on the cardinalities of the individual
domains. A natural alternative is to restrict oneself to cardinalities smaller than or equal to
the smallest infinite cardinality ℵ0 since, according to the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem,
every infinitely satisfiable sentence is satisfiable in ℵ0, which means that formal languages
cannot express the difference between worlds of different infinite cardinalities.
2.1. Carnap’s state description semantics
State descriptions are collections of atomic sentences and their negations. Every state
description contains, for each atomic sentence of the language, either the sentence itself or
its negation. For example, if the language contains the predicates P(x) and Q(x) and the
individual constant a, the possible state descriptions of the language are
(1){P(a),Q(a)}, {P(a),¬Q(a)}, {¬P(a),Q(a)}, {¬P(a),¬Q(a)}.
The different state descriptions of the language are regarded as linguistic descriptions of
possible states of affairs or possible worlds.
A Carnapian semantics contains at most a countable number of individual constants,
which means that infinite state descriptions are countable entities. Hence, the greatest car-
dinality among state descriptions is ℵ0.
In [1] and in the non-modal part of [2], quantifiers range over the individual constants
of the language. For example, (∃x)P (x) is read as follows:
P(a) is true for some individual constant a.1
1 Unlike in [1], in the part of [2] which considers modal systems, quantifiers are not defined by means of
substitution instances but by means of individual concepts (cf. [2, p. 183, fn. 3]). In the modal calculus of [2],
quantifiers are thus not interpreted substitutionally. This has a certain effect on which sentences are logically true
and which are not. An individual concept assigns an individual constant to each state description. The values of
variables range over individual concepts. A matrix P (x)with a free variable x holds in a given state description for
an individual concept iff P (a) holds in the state description and a is the constant assigned to the state description
by the individual concept in question. A universally quantified sentence holds in a state description iff it holds for
all individual concepts. An existentially quantified sentence holds in a state description if the matrix in the scope
of the quantifier holds for some individual concept. The necessity operator N applied to a matrix is interpreted in
the ordinary way: the matrix in the scope of N must hold in every state description.
All this means that a sentence of the form
(2)(∃t)N(A(t)∨ (∀u)∼A(u)),
where A(t) is an atomic matrix, is L-true (holds in every state description) in the semantics of [2], but not in that
of [1].
To demonstrate this, let us analyse the truth condition of (2) step by step in both semantics.
We begin with [1]. The sentence A(a) ∨ (∀u)¬A(u), where a is an arbitrary individual constant, cannot
hold in every state description. Consider a state description where A(a) does not hold and A(b) holds for some
other individual constant b; such a state description exists by the definition of state description semantics. Then
(∀u)¬A(u) does not hold, and hence, A(a)∨ (∀u)¬A(u) does not hold. It follows that A(a)∨ (∀u)¬A(u) cannot
be L-true for any individual constant a.
In [2], (2) holds in a state description if N(A(t) ∨ (∀u)¬A(u)) holds for some individual concept, which is
to say that there is an individual concept for which A(t) ∨ (∀u)¬A(u) holds in every state description.
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Correspondingly, (∀x)(P (x) means that
P(a) is true for an arbitrary individual constant a.
In objectual semantics, quantifiers refer to objects. The meanings of the existential and
universal quantifier are spelled out as
An individual exists for which the property denoted by P holds,
and
The property denoted by P holds for every individual,
respectively.
In substitutional semantics, the individual constants of a language form the class of
substitutable terms for every quantifier expression [2, p. 9]. The substitution instances of
a sentential matrix P(x) are all the sentences that can be formed by replacing x with
an individual constant, i.e., they are the syntactically well-formed instances of the matrix
P(x).
In Carnap’s semantics, the concept of L-truth is used to explicate the traditional notion
of logical truth. A sentence is L-true iff it holds in every state description of the given
language. However, this is not sufficient for saying that a sentence is logically true. It is
usually required that a logically true sentence must be true in every domain—the concept
of logical truth is not thought to be relative to the cardinality of the domain (the number of
individual constants in the language).
However, a single domain could be used as a basis of a modal semantics, like in Carnap’s
original formulation. For example, the set N of natural numbers can be considered to rep-
resent an infinite and enumerable set of individual terms. It will be shown in Section 5.1
that it is possible to formalize logical modalities when the calculus does not contain the
identity symbol ‘=’ by using N (or some other infinite cardinality).
Moreover, logical truth could be defined in such a way that a logically true sentence
holds in every model of every domain (cf. [3]). For a given domain D, one could then
define modal operators quantifying over the totality of models in D. The problem with
this approach is that the range of quantification over possible domains remains undefined,
which means that the totality of possible worlds also remains unspecified. Without having
specified what the totality of possible worlds is, one clearly cannot define such operators
for modalities which would range over the logically possible worlds.
The problem with giving up the idea of a single domain for all possible worlds is that
then one has to specify a totality of logically possible domains. This problem is present in
This truth condition is fulfilled, since there obviously exists an individual concept which assigns to each
state description—save those in which A does not hold for any constant—such a constant that A holds for that
constant. Hence, in those state descriptions in which A does not hold for any constant, the right disjunct of
A(t)∨ (∀u)¬A(u) holds, and in the rest of the state descriptions, the left disjunct holds. The sentence (2) is thus
L-true in the sense of [2].
Which sentences (even of those that do not contain the equality sign ‘=’ between individual constants)
are valid in Carnap’s modal logic hinges thus on whether we prefer to use the 1946 system with the effects of
substitutional quantification or the 1947 system with quantification over individual concepts. Since this article
mainly considers substitutional quantification, further discussions will be based mostly on the first option.
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Kripke semantics as well. For example, in [9], domains of individuals are given in the form
ψ(H), where H is a possible world and ψ is a function defined over the set of possible
worlds. The range of ψ is the set of domains it allows for, which means that for logical
modalities, the range of ψ should be the set of logically possible domains.
We could think of replacing the single and constant domain with a collection of domains
corresponding to subsets of the set of natural numbers. This could be a viable course to
take classically, at least when there is no need to deal with quantification in modal contexts
(which is always potential a cause of harm and trouble in modal calculi). Constructively,
however, the set of all subsets of natural numbers does not make sense. A set must be given
by stating rules to construct its elements, which is a principle that applies also to all the
subsets of N . But no group of rules could express all possible rules to build subsets out
of N—hence, no set of subsets of N is possible in constructive logic.
Neither is restricting the domain to finite subsets of N a satisfactory solution. The rea-
son will be made clear at the end of Section 6.5. However, a consistent formalization is
achieved by associating just one domain with each cardinality. The domain associated with
some particular cardinality consists of all individual constants up to the ordinal correspond-
ing to that cardinality. For instance, there will be only one domain with three individual
constants, viz., the domain that consists of the first three constants. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the domains form a linear order, from the smallest to the greatest. This as-
sumption is essential for the purposes of this paper: it enables us to employ the idea that a
sentence is true in an infinite cardinality if and only if it is true in all extensions of some
approximation of it (see Section 6.5). It is also assumed that the constants in each domain
are arranged in a linear order, from the first to the last, like the positions in Carnap’s co-
ordinate language S3 (cf. [2, pp. 74–75]). This makes it possible to treat the individual
constants simply as natural numbers.
2.2. World-relative substitution classes
2.2.1. The motivation
In Carnap’s original semantics, there is just a single domain of quantification, which is
the class of all individual constants of the language. Let us denote the set of sentences by
Sentence. The expression S ∈ Sentence means then that S is a sentence. Let T be the set of
individual constants of the language. An expression of the form
(3)S(t) ∈ Sentence (t ∈ T )
means that S(t) is a sentence under the assumption that t is an individual constant.
But is it philosophically sound to assume that the substitution class is constant from
world to world?
If the substitution class is thought to consist of individual constants that have a de-
notation, it is not plausible to assume it to be invariable. To understand this, consider the
following. Individuals (referents of individual expressions) may come to existence or cease
to exist when moving from one world to another. In other words, it is possible that an indi-
vidual which exists in this world does not exist in some other world, and that an individual
which exists in some other world does not exist in this world. Individual domain is thus
not constant across the possible worlds. In order to keep the single substitution class, one
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should assume that the denotations of expressions change so that in the extreme case of a
one-individual world all individual expressions would denote the one and the same indi-
vidual.
But what if one allows expressions that do not have a denotation? Would it then be
plausible to assume that there is just a single substitution class?
Consider the standard expressions of the Carnapian coordinate language (see Sec-
tion 2.1). The expression ‘5. individual’ means the fifth individual and nothing else. If
standard expressions had many possible interpretations, they would no longer be standard.
In other words, in a semantics with standard expressions their interpretation must be as-
sumed to be fixed. It is then clear that applying the expression ‘5. individual’ to a sentential
matrix cannot yield a truth-valued sentence in any world where there are less than five in-
dividuals.
Standard expressions can be considered to be a special case of the more general concept
of rigid designator, with the above applying to rigid designators overall. The need for vari-
able substitution classes thus arises both in semantics with the assumption that all constants
denote and in semantics where some constants are considered to be rigid designators.
To sum up, it is clear that one must have variable individual domains in objectual se-
mantics. This can be argued also in substitutional semantics. The above argument may be
presented by the following three clauses:
(1) The individual domain (in the objectual sense) cannot be constant since individuals
may come into existence or cease to exist.
(2) Assumption: a constant substitution class of denoting individual terms. Result: in the
one-individual world, all (possibly denumerably many) individual constants must refer
to the same individual.
(3) Even if the denotation requirement stated in (2) is removed, variable substitution
classes are needed if the language contains rigid designators (such as standard ex-
pressions).
But in the constructivistic setting, there is an even stronger argument for variable substitu-
tion classes, which goes as follows. Nested substitution classes play a very important role
in the formalization constructive state description semantics since they provide a means to
give meaning to factual quantifications in the infinite substitution class. A series of sub-
stitution classes with constantly increasing numbers of individual constants are needed for
further and further approximations of the infinite substitution class. A collection of nested
substitution classes can be linearly ordered in such a way that a class with a larger cardinal-
ity contains all the constants that belong to classes of smaller cardinalities, hence providing
us with a series of constantly larger approximations of the infinite substitution class. Ap-
proximations of the infinite substitution class would not be possible without variable finite
substitution classes. With nested and variable substitution classes, they can be seen to be
possible.2
2 For further details, see Sections 5.1 and 6.
R. Holm / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 13–46 19
2.2.2. Objectual quantification
When quantifiers are interpreted objectually, individual domains are in a position equiv-
alent to substitution classes in substitutional semantics. While in substitutional semantics
the objects that one talks about in quantification are individual expressions, in objectual
semantics they are considered to be objects belonging to the ‘furniture’ of the worlds.
As mentioned above, the need for variable domains of existing individuals is evident. In
substitutional semantics, variable domains are necessary in some particular (though impor-
tant) kinds of semantics; in objectual semantics, variable domains are necessary without
exceptions.
If individuals are denumerable in number, one can assign a name for each of them. In
this case, the individual domains can be presented as substitution classes, where individual
constants bear a one-to-one relation to individuals.
2.2.3. The formalization
In what follows, I will introduce a notation which is essentially similar to the one used
in Martin-Löf’s type theory. The reason for using this kind of formalism is that it provides
us with sufficient means to express functional dependencies between individual constants
and state descriptions.
The part of (3) which is in parentheses is called a context. Contexts contain an arbitrary
number of assumptions with the relation sign ∈. Contexts may also be progressive. For
example, the context in (4) below is progressive since w ∈ W(t) contains the variable
introduced by the earlier assumption t ∈ T . The expression (4) is read as follows (before
we have stated what set W(t) is): S(t,w) is a sentence under the assumption that t is an
individual constant and w is a member of the set W(t).
By defining a set of worlds (or state descriptions) for each individual constant, we can
limit the range of possible interpretations or models of a sentence, which would be a way
to obtain different classes of individual constants for different worlds:
(4)S(t,w) ∈ Sentence (t ∈ T , w ∈W(t)),
where W(t) denotes the set of worlds in which the constant t can be used. The drawback
with this technique is that non-modal quantification is no longer possible because w de-
pends on t . Trying to quantify in any world would generate an ill-formed expression, where
t occurs both bound and free:
(5)(∀t ∈ T )S(t,w) ∈ Sentence (w ∈W(t)).
Instead of this approach, we might employ world-relative substitution classes. They can
be formalized by limiting the range of variables in sentential matrices in a state description
w to terms that belong to the substitution class SC(w) of w:
(6)S(w, t) ∈ Sentence (w ∈W, t ∈ SC(w)).
In (6), the set over which the variable t ranges depends on the value of w. The value of
SC(w) determines the set of individual constants that have an interpretation in the corre-
sponding world. For every worldw, there is a subset ofW which contains the worlds whose
lexicon includes the individual constants of w; in other words, worlds that are models of
the language of w.
20 R. Holm / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 13–46
3. Modalities3.1. Quantification and world-relative domains
Modal operators can be thought of as quantifiers over possible worlds. Unfortunately,
defining quantification in modal contexts following the formalization of sentences intro-
duced by (6) results in serious difficulties. As an example, an expression
(7)(∃t ∈ SC(w))(∃w′ ∈W)S(w′, t) ∈ Sentence (w ∈W)
is ill-formed because nothing guarantees that all the expressions in SC(w) are also in
SC(w′) (where w′ is bound by the existential quantifier), as required by (6).
A solution to this problem is to declare that w′ is an element of the set of alternatives
to w,
(8)w′ ∈Walt(w)
if and only if the corresponding substitution classes are nested:
(9)SC(w)⊆ SC(w′).
Now (7) becomes
(10)(∃t ∈ SC(w))(∃w′ ∈Walt(w)
)
S(w′, t) ∈ Sentence (w ∈W).
The formula is well-formed since if t ∈ SC(w) then also t ∈ SC(w′).3
Limiting alternative worlds to those that contain at least the objects that exist in this
world constitutes a prima facie unnatural foundation for logical modalities because we do
not want to assume that every individual expression of this world is among the individual
expressions of all of its alternatives, i.e., that the actual world is of the smallest cardinality
of all of its logical alternatives. If the calculus contains the identity symbol ‘=’, it is possi-
ble to form sentences that are satisfiable only in a domain of some specific cardinality. For
instance,
(11)(∀x)(∀y)(x = y)
is satisfied in every (non-empty) domain of exactly one individual. However, instead of
considering the smallest alternative cardinality as that of the actual world, the smallest
alternative cardinality can be defined as the smallest one where each individual constant
of the sentence in the scope of the modal operator in question has an interpretation. For
example, if the individual constant ‘3’ occurs in the scope of a modal operator, the worlds
of a lesser cardinality than three would not be among the alternatives over which the modal
3 Note that the clauses from (6) to (10) are meant to express general forms of sentential matrices, including
atomic ones. In general, S(w) is a combination of atomic sentences (i.e., atomic matrices applied to individual
constants) and atomic matrices connected by logical constants (including quantifiers). To be able to regard S(w)
as depending only on w and not on any other variables defined over W , one must assume that all the constituents
of S(w) depend on w. For example, in P (w1)&Q(w2) we must require that w1 = w2. Hence, all individual
constants occurring in S(w) must belong to SC(w).
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operator quantifies. Hence, every world would in principle be a logical alternative to every
other world, but such worlds would be excluded where the sentence in question does not
have an interpretation. This variant of nested substitution classes allows for a logically
possible sentence which states that there are n individuals even when n is smaller than the
cardinality of the actual world. The disadvantage is that every expression which belongs
to the substitution class of the actual world is no longer substitutable in quantification in
modal contexts since such an expression may not belong to some alternative substitution
class. For a sentence with no occurrences of individual constants, the smallest alternative
substitution class contains exactly one individual expression (say, a1), and condition (9)
becomes
(12)SC(w)⊆ {a1},
which means that quantifiers may get a rather unnatural interpretation in modal contexts,
as illustrated by the following example:
(13)(∀t ∈ {a1}
)(∀w′ ∈Walt(w)
)
S(w′, t) ∈ Sentence (w ∈W).
3.2. Type-object relation
The above formalization of nesting conditions presumes that a classical subset relation
is definable in the language, i.e., that if x ∈A and A⊆ B , then x ∈ B . However, in strictly
typed languages (such as Martin-Löf’s type theory) objects do not stand by themselves but
are from the very beginning considered to be objects of some particular type. The relation
denoted by ⊆ cannot thus be defined in the usual way: if x is defined to be of type A, it
cannot also be of type B .
When keeping this in mind, it can be seen that in (10) above, t must not occur free in
(∃w′ ∈ Walt)S(w′, t), where w′ occurs bound, since t is defined to be a member of the
substitution class SC(w′).
In addition to their prima facie unnaturalness, nested substitution classes constitute a
problem associated particularly with the formalization of modal logic in strictly typed lan-
guages.
In what follows, a different kind of solution to quantification problems in modal con-
texts is examined. The main idea is to define substitution classes as a family of sets over
cardinalities, and not over worlds as was done above. This makes it possible to capture
the effect of set-theoretic inclusion relation by using the relation ‘<’ (smaller than) over
natural numbers; a domain x can be said to be part of a larger domain y if and only if x < y
holds. This gives us the opportunity to also employ strictly typed languages.
All individual constants of any substitution class that do not occur in S(w) have the same
effect on its truth. If S(w) is true, the complex property it expresses holds for the individual
constants occurring in it. The truth of S(w) may require that the substitution class contain
more individual constants than these and that some properties hold for them, but it imposes
no constraints on which particular constants should be included in the substitution class
over and above the ones occurring in S(w). Hence, when considering the alternatives to w,
we may confine ourselves to one substitution class for each cardinality. One could then try
to solve the problem which arises from giving up nested domains by designating sizes of
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worlds and worlds of a particular size with distinct variables:(14)S(w, t) ∈ Sentence (s ∈N, w ∈W(s), t ∈ SC(s)).
(14) makes use of the assumption that there is only one substitution class for each car-
dinality. Example (7) becomes
(15)(∃t ∈ SC(s))(∃w ∈W(s))S(w, t) ∈ Sentence (s ∈N).
It can be objected that this solution represents a very restricted type of modalities be-
cause we quantify only over worlds with some particular size s (say, the size of actual
world). Adding a quantifier that ranges over cardinalities would not change the situation
since the sentence would then just say that (15) holds for some cardinality:
(16)(∃s ∈N)(∃t ∈ SC(s))(∃w ∈W(s))S(w, t) ∈ Sentence.
In other words, (16) would not express quantification in a modal context in which modal
operators denote logical modalities. The difference becomes clear if we think of logical
necessity instead of logical possibility:
(17)(∀s ∈N)(∃t ∈ SC(s))(∀w ∈W(s))S(w, t) ∈ Sentence.
The sentence in (17) does not say that there is an individual constant for which S holds in
each world, but rather that for every cardinality, there is an individual constant for which S
holds in every world of that cardinality. In the next section, we will discuss the possibility
of defining sentential matrices over the union of all domains instead of being limited to the
substitution class of a particular world since world-relative substitution classes have been
seen to present severe difficulties if quantification in modal contexts is to be reasonably
formalized.
4. Possibilistic quantification
Possibilistic quantification means quantification over the union of all domains (cf. [4]).
In substitutional semantics, this amounts to saying that sentential matrices are defined over
some single set of individual terms like in (3) above.
Substitution classes are introduced as two-place relations over the sets of individual
terms and worlds:
(18)SC(t,w) ∈ Sentence (t ∈ T , w ∈W).
SC(t,w) says that t belongs to the substitution class of the world w.
If SC(t,w) is true for every t and every w, the present formalism is equivalent to Car-
nap’s original semantics with a constant domain of individual terms. In any other case,
there is more than one domain of individual terms.
With the predicate SC(t,w) one has access to world-relative quantifiers, which are de-
fined in the following way:
(∃wt ∈ T )P (t,w)= (∃t ∈ T )
(
SC(t,w)&P(t,w)
)
,
(19)(∀wt ∈ T )P (t,w)= (∀t ∈ T )
(
SC(t,w)⊃ P(t,w)).
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But what happens if SC(t,w) is false, i.e., when the term t does not belong to the substi-
tution class of the world w? We are facing a difficult question: how to determine the truth
value of atomic sentences which contain occurrences of the term t? This problem arises
typically in situations where modal operators occur in the scope of ordinary quantifiers, as
in (20):
(20)(∀wt ∈ T )(∀w ∈W)A(t,w),
where A(t,w) is an atomic matrix.
It may now be the case that SC(a, v) is false for some a and v, i.e., that a is not in the
substitution class of the world v, which raises the question of the interpretation of A(a, v).
It might be declared that atomic sentences including terms that do not belong to the
substitution class of the world in question are simply false. This kind of approach would,
however, be philosophically inconsistent. Recall that the substitution class of a world con-
sists of individual terms which have an interpretation in the world. If an atomic sentence
contains occurrences of individual terms that do not have an interpretation, it cannot de-
note any atomic state of affairs, and hence is incapable of being true or false of any world.
Declaring such atomic sentences false is a violation of the definition of a sentence, since a
sentence is a linguistic entity that describes how things are in the world.
The situation is equally difficult in objectual semantics. Objectual semantics just shifts
the problems of substitutional semantics and variable domains from the level of language
onto the level of interpretation. Consider the case where t in A(t) is assigned an individual
that doesn’t exist in w. Can the property assigned to A(t) hold for that individual then?
Kripke [9, p. 85] takes the position that it can and that it can also be the case that it doesn’t
hold, irrespective of the fact that the individual is outside the domain of the world. But how
can an individual belong to the extension of a predicate, if it doesn’t even exist? A way to
avoid this question could be to simply declare such predications false. However, even if
we did this, there would still be some complex predicates, such as the negations of atomic
predicates or logical truths, which would apply to the non-existent individuals. With this
approach, we cannot escape the unnatural situation of attributing properties to non-existent
individuals.
4.1. Truth values gaps
One solution to the above problems is to introduce truth values gaps: if SC(a, v) is false,
then no atomic sentence where a occurs has a truth value.4
In a semantics with truth values gaps, the logical constants of ordinary predicate logic
cannot be defined in the standard manner. For example, the negation of a sentence is not
always true when the sentence itself is not true, since from a sentence being not true it
no longer follows that it is false. Thus, the concept of validity cannot be defined in the
standard manner. Consider the sentence
(21)∼ (A(t,w)∧∼A(t,w)),
4 The arguments presented in this section apply, when slightly modified, also to objectual semantics, where
the truth conditions of quantifiers are not given by their substitution instances.
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which is valid in predicate logic, i.e., true in every world (state description) w. However,
truth values gaps force us to alter the notion of validity since there are worlds where t is
not defined, and (21) is thus not true.
In the light of these considerations, it must be said that a sentence is valid if and only if
it is never false. Accordingly, the truth condition for the necessity operator goes as follows:
(∀w)S(w)is true if and only if S(w) is not false in any world w.
However, here we again run into trouble. The actualization principle
(22)(∀w ∈W)S(w)
S(w′)
,
which says that if S(w) is necessary, then it is true, can no longer be accepted. On the other
hand, the so-called axiom of necessity
(23)(∀w ∈W)(S(w)⊃ S(w′))
is valid since the fact that it fails to have a truth value in some world w′ cannot affect its
validity. This means that implication A⊃ B is no longer associated with B being derivable
from A.
Let us assume that S(w) is of the form S′(a,w). We could try to formalize the necessity
operator by means of implication:
(24)(∀w)(SC(a,w)⊃ S′(a,w)).
However, (24) is not a solution to the problem associated with (22), since although
(25)(∀w)(SC(a,w)⊃ S′(a,w))⊃ (SC(a,w′)⊃ S′(a,w′))
is valid, the corresponding inference to the consequent of the implication is not allowed.
How to synchronize the inference rules and the semantics of logical constants so that
implication would again bear a one-to-one relation to derivability?
First, one could declare an implication sentence false if the antecedent is true and the
consequent is not bearing a truth value. Then (23) would no longer be valid, which would
solve the disparity between (23) and (22). Unfortunately, the predicate logic theorem
(26)(∀t)S(t,w)⊃ S(t ′,w)
for quantifiers ranging over individuals would not be valid either, since S(t ′,w) could lack
truth value, which means that stock of valid sentences would deviate significantly from that
of ordinary first-order logic.
Second, one could say that a valid sentence must be true in every world. This would,
however, have similar consequences as the first approach since (26) is not true in every
world for every individual constant t ′.
Instead of being a firm solution to the problem of terms or individuals that do not belong
to the substitution class of the world, truth values gaps only appear to replace the original
problems with some new ones. However, something similar to truth values gaps can be
used to solve the problem of variable substitution classes, as will be shown in Section 5.2.
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4.2. Individual conceptsThe situation in a modal semantics where the domain is a collection of individual con-
cepts (like in [2]) is not much different from substitutional semantics.
An individual concept assigns an individual constant to each state description. The val-
ues of variables range over individual concepts. A matrix P(x) with a free variable x holds
in a given state description for an individual concept iff P(a) holds in the state description
and a is the constant assigned to the state description by the individual concept in question.
A universally quantified sentence holds in a state description iff it holds for all individual
concepts. An existentially quantified sentence holds in a state description if the matrix in
the scope of the quantifier holds for some individual concept.
The necessity operator N applied to a matrix is interpreted in the ordinary way: the
matrix in the scope of N must hold in every state description.
Individual concepts are best formalized as functions from possible worlds to individual
constants. (20) now becomes
(27)(∀i ∈ I)(∀w ∈W)A(i(w),w).
For (27) to make sense, the individual concepts must be defined in each world, in other
words, they must assign an individual constant to every world. This means that individual
concepts must have an interpretation in every world, i.e., they must yield truth-valued sen-
tences in every world. The situation is analogous to (3), where we had a constant set of
individual terms, and we required that each term have an interpretation in every world. The
problems that are associated with individual concepts are thus similar to those associated
with constant domains of individual terms. As in the case of individual terms, assuming
that individual concepts have an interpretation in every world is unnatural. The other prob-
lem, which is related to the concept of infinity, will be discussed in the next section.
5. Constant infinite domains
5.1. N as the only domain
It was already noted above that quantification can be defined in the modal context by
applying the restriction that the modal operators quantify over worlds of some particular
cardinality (see Section 3.2). If it could be proven that a sentence which is true in some
finite state description, is satisfiable in any larger domain, logical possibility could be jus-
tifiably represented by worlds with the domain N .
A sentence which is true in some finite state description needs to be proved to also be
true in a state description with the cardinality of N . Such a proof is available in Leblanc
[10, pp. 219-222]. Leblanc proves that every sentence in a model set is true in some state
description for a given language L without the identity symbol ‘=’ which contains at
least those individual constants that occur in the sentences of the model set. Model sets,
introduced by Hintikka [7], are collections of sentences fulfilling certain conditions. It is
easily shown that the set of all sentences true in a model (state descriptions can be viewed
as models) is a model set [7, pp. 23–24]. Hence, if a sentence S is true in a finite state
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description, it belongs to a model set and is thereby true in some state description of every
adequately extensive language L′.
Leblanc’s proof is based on effectively constructing the required state description from
what is known of the model set; hence, no indirect inference is employed.
Why not then simply adopt a constant and infinite domain of cardinality N since all sat-
isfiable formulas must be satisfiable in such a domain in a calculus without ‘=’? Atomic
predicates could then be formalized as effectively computable functions from natural num-
bers and a set of functions to truth values (illustrated below by a monadic atomic predicate):
(28)P(a,wP ) ∈ Boolean (a ∈N, wP ∈N → Boolean).
Here state descriptions as collections of entities representing atomic sentences and their
negations have been replaced by deterministic rules that assign a truth value to each (com-
bination of) natural number(s). The variable wP ranges over all the lawlike possibilities
of assigning a truth value to an atomic sentence given by a and P . The problem with this
approach is that the lawlike functions do not provide a way to refer to state descriptions
which are not completely known by us in the sense of our being able to compute the truth
value of an arbitrary atomic sentence. This is a serious drawback because, in reality, worlds
are not given to us by deterministic functions. Worlds are out there waiting to be explored.
We can state hypotheses about them, but even if we could establish that a finite part of
some world complied with a deterministic rule, we can never come to the conclusion that
the rest of the world complies with the same rule (or any other rule).5
5.2. Proof-objects as indicators for interpretability
In the above sections elaborating the problems associated with quantification in modal
contexts, it was tacitly assumed throughout the text that individual constants are simple
expressions that are not analyzable into more elementary parts.
Equipped with this assumption, sentential matrices were concluded to be functions
which can be applied to a given individual constant provided only that the constant in
question belongs to the set (substitution class) over which the matrix is defined. The rea-
son for this was the desire to assign each world a collection of individual constants which
yield (meaningful) sentences in that particular world.
However, by defining individual variables as ranging over different substitution classes,
more was actually done than required. The formation of expressions where the individ-
ual constant is not a member of the substitution class over which the sentential matrix in
question is defined was prohibited altogether, although what should have been done was to
merely declare that such expressions are not (meaningful) sentences.
Think of the sentence ‘there are exactly three individuals, and the fourth individual is
red’. The most natural alternative is to regard it as grammatical but meaningless.
In this article, one of the main concerns has been to avoid problems associated with
assigning truth values to expressions which are not meaningful. Therefore, variations in
5 It is worth observing that also possibilistic semantics is liable to this objection, since there we also have a
constant domain, viz., the domain of possible individuals.
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meaningfulness rather than variations in grammar between the possible worlds are more
interesting for the purposes of this paper.
When regarding sentences as well-defined expressions in every possible world, the
question of what to do with sentences that contain individual terms not belonging to the
substitution class of some world must be answered. Truth values gaps, which were dis-
cussed in Section 4.1, provide one possible answer, but as was seen, these lead to further
problems concerning the concepts of validity and inference. This is because truth values
gaps treat the failure to denote a truth value as a third truth value, which has to be given
its own semantical rules. What should be done instead is simply to declare that a sentence
denotes a truth value under such and such conditions—not that a sentence denotes a truth
value under such and such conditions and a truth values gap otherwise. Instead of intro-
ducing truth values gaps in the sense outlined in Section 4.1, our semantics will simply
require that in order to be interpreted in a world (i.e., in our case, to denote either of the
truth values) a sentence must contain only occurrences of individual terms that belong to
the substitution class of the world in question.
Rather than having individual constants as elements of different substitution classes,
a fixed set of terms will be used so that the terms will be accompanied by an additional
expression indicating the existence of an interpretation for the term in a given world.
It must be stressed that it is not claimed that treating individual constants as compound
expressions is in accordance with our intuitions about what kind of entities individual con-
stants are. Instead, it is suggested that certain conceptual difficulties can be avoided if we
follow this idea.
In order to be able to do this, one needs a formal language which follows the
“propositions-as-types” principle, according to which propositions are sets and proofs are
elements. In such languages (like in Martin-Löf’s type theory), saying that the proposi-
tion A has a proof means the same as saying that the set A has an element.
If this kind of formal system is at our disposal, sentential matrices can be defined in the
following manner:
(29)S(t,p,w) ∈ Sentence (w ∈W, t ∈ T , p ∈ SC(t,w)),
where SC(t,w) says that t belongs to the domain of the world w and p is the proof-object
for that fact.
In formalizing the formula (7) above, there are now two options, depending on how we
interpret the notion of logical truth. The choice concerns the quantifier that will be used to
bind the variable p in (29). The alternatives to formalize possibility and necessity are the
following:
(∃w ∈W)(∃p ∈ SC(t,w),
(∃w ∈W)(∀p ∈ SC(t,w),
(∀w ∈W)(∃p ∈ SC(t,w),
(30)(∀w ∈W)(∀p ∈ SC(t,w).
The first option denotes possibility with the interpretability condition for the individual
terms. The second one is possibility under every interpretation. This conception might
require a little elaboration. A sentence may be possible in the sense of the second quantifier
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prefix even if it is not true in any state description for any interpretation of its individual
constants, since any sentence is true in any state description for all interpretations of its
individual constants if there are no such interpretations. This conception of possibility is
rather awkward since intuitively what is meant by saying that a sentence is possible is that
there is an interpretation for it. On the other hand, with the necessity operator, we actually
have two options. The first denotes truth in all possible state descriptions (worlds), and the
second, truth in all possible worlds and interpretations of the individual constants occurring
in the sentence. Proceeding with (7) along the first line of (30) above yields
(31)(∃t ∈ T )(∃p ∈ SC(t,w))(∃w′ ∈W)(∃p′ ∈ SC(t,w′))S(t,p′,w′) (w ∈W).
To show another example, the modal predicate logic sentence (∀x)✷S(x) can be for-
malized either as
(32)(∀t ∈ T )(∀p ∈ SC(t,w))(∀w′ ∈W)(∀p′ ∈ SC(t,w′))S(t,p′,w′) (w ∈W)
or as
(33)(∀t ∈ T )(∀p ∈ SC(t,w))(∀w′ ∈W)(∀p′ ∈ SC(t,w′))S(t,p′,w′) (w ∈W).6
Note that the interpretability condition expressed by the variable p cannot be stated in any
other way than with a proposition like SC(t,w). As soon as sentences are defined without
having a variable like p in the context, we commit ourselves to a semantics where the
sentences must have some semantic value in every world, be it a truth value or a truth values
gap. Moreover, it is also essential to employ the relation SC(t,w) instead of t ∈ SC(w),
since the former enables us to bind w before binding t .
It remains to show how SC(t,w) could be interpreted in constructive logic. This ques-
tion is mainly how to define the totality of worlds W . It will be shown that the relation
SC(t,w) is most plausibly defined in such a way that it becomes decidable, which means
that atomic sentences will also be decidable.
6. State descriptions as sequences
6.1. The totality of possible worlds
In intuitionistic mathematics, there are basically two ways of acquiring information
about an infinite structure: one may draw conclusions about the structure on the basis of
some finite approximation of it, or one may make use of the rule which identifies the
structure. For example, the set of natural numbers may be proved to have a property using
the introduction and elimination rules of the set, or by using the information that some set
{1,2, . . . , n} is an approximation of N . In the case of N , this way of acquiring information
reduces to using a rule, since the rule also determines the approximations of the set.
6 Note that with the ordinary quantification the quantifier prefix cannot be (∀t ∈ T )(∃p ∈ SC(t,w)) since that
expresses the requirement that all individual constants belong to the substitution class of w. In addition, under
the usual assumption that every substitution class contains at least one constant, the expressions (∃t ∈ T )(∀p ∈
SC(t,w)) and (∃t ∈ T )(∃p ∈ SC(t,w)) are equivalent.
R. Holm / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 13–46 29
The formalization of state descriptions as lawless sequences means that in the case of
an infinite sequence, there is no rule to calculate the value of an arbitrary term of the
sequence. This concept of infinity is not infinity in the sense of the set of natural numbers,
of which we know how to form the (n + 1)th element (simply by adding one to the nth
element), or some other rule-determined infinite set. Consequently, everything that can be
said about lawless infinite sequences must be said on the basis of finite approximations
of them. One might therefore think that a more genuine way to incorporate infinity in
state description semantics would have been to take the set N to serve as the domain of
quantification (at least in calculi without ‘=’), enabling us to use the defining rules of N to
prove propositions about it. In fact, having infinite domains like N has a certain influence
on the stock of satisfiable sentences. If one is allowed to use three distinct variables in a
single sentence, one can construct an ‘axiom of infinity’ which is not true in any finite
domain but is true in some infinite domain. An example of such a sentence is
(∀x)∼R(x, x)& (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)(R(x, y)&R(y, z)⊃R(x, z))
(34)& (∀y)(∃x)R(x, y).
The negation of (34) is valid if the semantics comprises only finite domains. However,
using N as the only domain means that the idea of having domains of different cardinali-
ties in the same framework has to be given up, which is a drawback in both classical and
constructivistic logic in languages with the identity symbol ‘=’ (see Section 3.1). In Sec-
tion 5, in the constructive approach, the state description semantics was shown to lose its
capability of representing contingent states of affairs if domains like N are allowed.
The nature of state description semantics strongly depends on the type of entities one
chooses as interpretations of state descriptions. If state descriptions are interpreted as law-
less sequences, the semantics will be constructive and two-valued. If the domain D is a set,
two-valued logic will be intuitionistically acceptable only if D is finite; otherwise (e.g.,
if D = N ), the logic involves quantifying over an infinite set. Since the former interpre-
tation is more plausible, constructive modalities—somewhat surprisingly—do not exclude
bivalent semantics.
6.2. Choice sequences
Infinite state descriptions are infinite sets or classes consisting of atomic sentences and
their negations. This kind of entity can be represented by an infinite sequence of 0:s and
1:s, in which one position has been assigned to every atomic sentence. If the position value
is 0, the corresponding atomic sentence is false; if the value is 1, the atomic sentence is
true.
The lawless sequences mentioned above are special cases of the more general concept
of a choice sequence. The properties of choice sequences can be determined either by
knowing a rule that effectively outputs a value for a given position or knowing a finite ap-
proximation of the sequence. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the set N and
the rule-determined or lawlike infinite sequence 〈0,1,2, . . .〉. The nth term of the sequence
can be computed by using the rule of adding one to the (n− 1)th term. A lawless sequence
is a sequence whose terms are not governed by any restriction (other than the a priori re-
striction for terms to be of the specified type, e.g., natural numbers); such a sequence is
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generated (and identified) by a process involving repeated arbitrary selection of one term
after another. A partly free sequence is such where some, but not total, restriction may be
imposed upon choices of terms. (Cf. [6, 418, 423], [19, 12].)
The principle of open data states that the truth of any statement made about a lawless
sequence can depend only upon some initial segment of it:
(35)ϕ(ξ)→∃x∀η(ξ¯ x = η¯x→ ϕ(η)),
where ξ¯ = 〈ξ(0), ξ(1), . . . , ξ(x − 1)〉, i.e., the initial segment of length x of ξ . In words:
if ϕ holds for the lawless sequence ξ , then there is an initial segment of ξ such that all
lawless7 continuations of this sequence also satisfy ϕ (cf. [5, p. 313]).
The principle can be justified as follows: ϕ(ξ) is established after a finite number of
values of ξ have been chosen because at any time this is all the available information on ξ
that there is. Therefore, the continuation of this particular initial segment is irrelevant, i.e.,
all continuations also have the property ϕ (op.cit., pp. 313–314).
Lawless sequences can be viewed as never-ending processes, which means that it is
not possible to select a term that would stop the process. However, it will be argued in
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 that in order to be representable in a constructive language, discussions
about lawless sequences must be interpreted by means of finite sequences. This means that
the framework which is used to formalize choice sequences must allow for terms that
terminate the selection process.
One can use the same framework for analysing all types of choice sequences, because
they can be considered to represent different readings on the same scale. On one end of this
scale, there are the lawless sequences with no restrictions at all concerning the selection of
terms, and on the other end, lawlike sequences with total restrictions. This can be done by
means of spreads: we declare the sequences to be elements of a spread. For each spread,
we associate a spread law, which, when applied to any finite initial segment, determines
whether or not the segment is admissible to the spread. At one extreme, the restriction set
up by the spread law may be completely empty, and we get a lawless sequence. At the other
extreme, the restriction may fully determine the terms; in this case, the result is a lawlike
sequence. (Cf. [6, pp. 65–66, 423].)
As already mentioned, state descriptions can be formalized as binary sequences, finite
or infinite. In Carnap’s [1,2] formulation, the number of atomic sentences was constant be-
cause the language was thought of as being laid down as a whole from the very beginning.
One might, however, like to deal with domains of different sizes within the same seman-
tical framework. For this purpose, a spread of finite binary sequences of varying lengths
can be introduced. At any stage in the process of developing sequences further, one can lay
down additional rules limiting the choice of new terms. It will be shown in Section 6.4 that
this kind of framework is an adequate metatheory for interpreting infinite sequences.
7 Limitation to lawless continuations is not essential—the quantification is just supposed to take place over
lawless sequences.
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6.3. Interpreting choice sequencesChoice sequences can be thought of as abstract entities whose properties one tries to
derive directly from the intrinsic nature of such entities. The open data principle, which is
taken as an axiom in the theory of choice sequences and which is justified by appealing
to the indeterminate character of lawless sequences, is a product of this kind of approach.
A more application-oriented way to deal with choice sequences is to incorporate them in a
formal language by allowing some particular expressions of the language to refer to them.
In formal languages, variables usually range over sets or classes of objects. To permit
substitution of choice sequences for free variables requires that they qualify as elements
of sets over which the variables range. We shall mainly concentrate on how this is done in
Martin-Löf’s type theory, but this can also be seen from a more generally constructivistic
point of view.
In most intuitionistic systems, it is prescribed that an element of a set be effectively
recognizable as being an element of that specific set. Let us see what this means for choice
sequences. If a choice sequence is governed by a spread law that pronounces it to be in-
finite, we never come to see what the sequence looks like in its entirety. If, for example,
we are dealing with binary lawless sequences, we never know more about such a sequence
than is given to us by a finite approximation such as 0(1(0(0(. . .)))). How can we then be
sure that the given expression really refers to an element of the set of binary sequences?
We know that the embodied initial segment is an initial segment of a binary sequence, but
we are not in a position to recognize that the three dots in fact refer to a valid continua-
tion(s) of the sequence—we must assume that they do. In other words, we assume that the
three dots also refer to a binary sequence or sequences. But what do we then assume? We
assume that the object referred to by the dots is recognizable as being an element of the
set of binary sequences. But this must then mean that the object referred to by dots is a
finite construction since otherwise it would not be possible to recognize it as an element
or elements of the set of binary sequences. 0(1(0(0(. . .)))) is thus effectively recognizable
as an element of the set of binary sequences only if it can be interpreted by means of finite
constructions. Choice sequences can be introduced as elements of sets only if they can be
interpreted in a finitistic semantics.
In Section 7.1, the notion of an infinite object of type theory will be introduced. It
will also be shown how expressions referring to infinite objects can be translated into ex-
pressions referring to finite objects. This translation renders the talk about infinite objects
constructively intelligible.
In Section 6.4 below, it will be shown that the notion of an infinite lawless sequence is
fully captured when sequences are formalized as infinite elements of sets, which is to say
that there is no broader notion of infinite lawless sequence than that which can be repre-
sented by infinite elements of constructively defined sets (which, in turn, can be represented
by finite elements of those sets).
6.4. The a priori restriction for sequences
A possible alternative to (28) is to take truth values to be determined by a lawless binary
sequence, of which we know only that its terms are 0’s and 1’s. Such a sequence of the
length bigger than or equal to i is denoted below by Seq(i). We present again an example
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of a monadic atomic predicate:(36)P(i, n, b) ∈ Sentence (i ∈N, n ∈ {n ∈N | n i}, b ∈ Seq(i)).
The nth binary digit in each element of Seq(i) tells whether the predicate P holds for
the nth individual or not. A set of sequences like Seq can be given separately for each
(monadic) predicate of the language. The collection of such sets would represent all the
possible state descriptions. Each complete assignment of values for the variables ranging
over such sequences would then represent some state description. It is clear from what was
said in the previous section that the number of digits in these sequences cannot be infinite
in the sense of N because they are given as elements of a set. At first, this restriction seems
significant. The indices of terms are natural numbers, which means that every property that
holds for the domain of natural numbers holds also for infinite sequences in the sense that
it holds for the set of their indices. However, it is argued below that this restriction is not
significant after all.
Earlier (Section 6.2), we mentioned that the only restriction that governs totally free
sequences is the a priori restriction that terms must be of some given type. Even totally free
sequences are thus not totally free but governed by a predetermined restriction. What does
it mean intuitionistically to say of an infinite collection of terms of a choice sequence that
each of them is of some given type, e.g., a natural number? Clearly we are then quantifying
over an infinite collection. The standard intuitionistic interpretation is that to be able to
assert a universally quantified sentence we must possess a method that effectively yields
proof of the property in question for every substitution instance of the quantifier. Hence, if
we say that we assume that every term in a choice sequence is a natural number, we actually
assume that we can prove that an arbitrarily selected term really is a natural number. We
can prove that some object is a natural number only by appealing to its construction, i.e.,
what it looks like. In the case of an arbitrary term of a choice sequence, we should possess
a method which would yield, when the index of the term in question has been input, an
object which is by its construction a natural number. But this means that there should be
a rule which would, for each term in the sequence, determine which natural number the
given term is, and thus the sequence would no longer be a lawless one.
What has been said above applies to other types of sequences as well. Hence, if state
descriptions are to be formalized as lawless sequences of truth values or binary digits, the
quantity of terms cannot be equal to the cardinality of an infinite set like N . Adopting N as
the fixed domain commits us either to classical logic or strictly lawlike sequences. The lat-
ter of these is not acceptable as a general framework of state description semantics because
it does not adequately capture the idea of state descriptions as descriptions of contingent
matters of fact. It follows that interpreting state descriptions as elements of a set does not
impose any additional restrictions on the applicability of the concept; in other words, every
state description that can be constructively given can be formalized in an elements-of-sets
interpretation.8
8 In calculi containing the identity symbol ‘=’, the constant domain assumption is of course problematic
also for another reason, which we already discussed in connection with the nested domains assumption (see
Section 3.1): a sentence saying that there is a world containing fewer individuals than the actual one becomes
logically impossible.
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6.5. Infinite state descriptionsSince we do not have infinite domains in the sense of N , our approach has a strong
finitistic bias. Nevertheless, we would still like to be able to refer to individual domains
that are infinite in the sense of being lawless, i.e., domains the size of which cannot be
denoted by any standard natural number.
Martin-Löf’s nonstandard type theory (see Section 7.1) supplements the vocabulary of
type theory with infinite choice sequences. Judgements containing occurrences of such ob-
jects are then given an interpretation in the standard theory. Everything that can be known
about infinite objects of the nonstandard theory is known from their finite approximations.
By means of the nonstandard natural number ∞, we can refer to a potentially infinite
cardinality. A sentence is true in a world of cardinality ∞ if and only if it is true in all
extensions of a world of some finite cardinality.
In the present approach to state description semantics, the more extensive of two substi-
tution classes contains all individual constants of the smaller class. In the sequel, this kind
of totality of substitution classes will be referred to as nested substitution classes, which
should not be confused with the idea of having nested substitution classes for each alter-
native world. Nested substitution classes can now be seen to be an essential requirement
since otherwise it would be difficult to explain the concept of approximating the infinite
domain further and further. Consider the situation where this condition is relaxed so that
substitution classes are no longer nested. Then, for each cardinality, an infinite number
of substitution classes exists. On the other hand, the approximations of ∞ must be given
by means of increasingly larger finite cardinalities, which means that for each finite car-
dinality, only a finite number of different substitution classes can be involved. The only
non-arbitrary solution to the question of which classes are to be included comes from the
idea of nested domains, which represent the process of getting acquainted with more and
more individuals (individual constants).
Furthermore, a sequence of substitution classes that are not nested is not an initial seg-
ment of any particular substitution class; hence, if some property holds for such a sequence
(and a truth value assignment for those atomic sentences that can be composed using the
available individual constants), it must in general be a property that holds simultaneously
for initial segments of several different state descriptions. Even if substitution classes were
arranged in such a way that some particular sequence(s) contained only nested substitution
classes, this qualification would not be possessed by every continuation of it, which implies
that some continuations of the sequence would bring forth substitution classes that are not
extensions of the substitution classes occurring in the sequence itself.
In fact, for every finite sequence of substitution classes, there are continuations with
occurrences of substitution classes that do not contain any individual constants from the
original sequence. This means that non-nested substitution classes cannot be used to for-
malize the idea of getting information about an infinite state description by studying its
initial segments. Every property that is attributed to a sequence on the basis of its initial
segment in the framework of non-nested substitution classes must also be possessed by
substitution classes (and state descriptions) which are not extensions of the substitution
classes occurring in the initial segment and do not even contain any individual terms from
the initial segment. Hence, in this approach, no property can hold on the basis of a finite
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amount of information about atomic facts since all the established atomic facts must cease
to obtain in the course of getting to know the values of subsequent terms of the sequence.
It follows that inspecting initial segments of a sequence is insufficient to establish any
properties for it, which means that all the obtaining facts must be formal or logical by
nature. Non-nested substitution classes are thus not acceptable if state descriptions are to
be formalized as choice sequences. Consequently, every sentence that limits the individual
constants to something different than what is included in one of the nested substitution
classes must be logically false, e.g., the sentence
(37)∀x(x = 2),
which says that the only existing individual is the one denoted by the number 2. We can
now proceed to look at the consequences of these considerations. They give rise to the
following formalization of sentential matrices:
(38)S(x, t,p,w) ∈ Sentence (x ∈N, t ∈N, p ∈ t < x, w ∈W(x)),
where x denotes the number of individual constants, t < x is the proposition saying that
the ordinal t = 0,1,2,3, . . . must be smaller than x , and p is the proof that this really is
the case. W(x) is a set of state descriptions of cardinality x , each of which determines the
truth values of all atomic sentences with occurrences of individual constants up to the xth
constant.
It is important to notice that in (38), the function S(x, t,p,w) does not have to yield a
member of the set Sentence for every individual constant t , since this is required to take
place only when a value for w is provided. S is thus not a deterministic rule to be applied
for each of the infinite number of t’s; it is rather a deterministic rule to be applied to each
value assignment to w, in other words, to each possible state description. Which of the
state descriptions is the actual one is not specified within the formal framework; hence, the
semantics itself is not committed to determinism.
(31) above now becomes
(∃t ∈N)(∃p ∈ t < x)(∃x ′ ∈N)(∃w ∈W(x ′))(∃p ∈ t < x ′)S(x ′, t,p,w)
(39)(x ∈N),
and (32) is interpreted as
(∀t ∈N)(∀p ∈ t < x)(∀x ′ ∈N)(∀w ∈W(x ′))(∀p ∈ t < x ′)S(x ′, t,p,w)
(40)(x ∈N).
7. The calculus CS
In this section, we introduce the logical calculus CS. Although all the constants of the
calculus can be explicitely defined by using the logical operators of Martin-Löf’s type
theory,9 we present only the heuristically interesting corollaries of the definitions, which
9 For a presentation of Martin-Löf’s type theory, see Martin-Löf [12–15], Ranta [16,17], Thompson [18] and
Magnusson [11].
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demonstrate how the constants compute to truth values.10 In the presentation of CS, we
sometimes leave the context of judgements or parts thereof implicit when confusion is
unlikely to arise.
Something much like type theory is needed to interpret (38) above, as (38) contains
both a progressive context and a proposition which is the set of its proof-objects. Using
type theory as a framework for CS has the advantage that we do not have to give meaning
explanations for its logical constants. Hence, the logical constants of CS are constructively
acceptable if type theory is. In type theory, a stock of inference rules is immediately at
hand, which means that we have an explicit and carefully studied metatheory for CS avail-
able. Furthermore, the decidability of type-theoretical judgements is a feature that enables
a computerized verification of theorems. Since the constants of CS will be given as com-
putable functions, the sentences of CS are themselves methods for checking their own
truth values in finite state descriptions; hence, there is no need for separate proof search
procedures for finite worlds.
7.1. The nonstandard extension of type theory
Besides the expressions of standard type theory, the nonstandard extension of type the-
ory also contains infinite objects, choice sequences. A choice sequence is type-theoretically
an infinitely deep sequence of mappings between contexts,
(41)α = f0
(
f1(. . .)
)
:A0.
The axioms
αi :Ai
αi = fi(αi+1) :N
(42)α = α0 :N
extend the system of standard type theory by adjoining the single choice sequence α.
As a special case, the axioms
∞i :N
∞i = s(∞i+1) :N
(43)∞=∞0 :N
define the nonstandard natural number ∞ [14, pp. 156–158].11
Judgements that contain nonstandard objects are nonstandardly justified if and only if
the judgement obtained by replacing all nonstandard objects with their approximations is
justified in standard type theory. For instance, the nonstandard judgement
(44)a(α) :A0
10 An earlier version of CS has been implemented for computer by the author. The implementation was done
using the type-theoretical proof editor ALF developed at the Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg.
11 In general, choice sequences do not have to proceed in the same way all the time, unlike ∞.
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is justified if and only if
(45)a(f1
(
f2
(
. . .
(
fi−1(xi)
)
. . .
)))
:A0 (xi :Ai)
is standardly justified for some i .12 (Cf. [14].)
In the general case, α does not necessarily refer to a single choice sequence, but to a
network of interdependent sequences. For example, a in (44) and (45) might depend on k
variables; then f1, for instance, would denote a sequence of functions in the following way:
(46)f1(x2)= f11(x21, . . . , x2l), . . . , f1k(x21, . . . , x2l),
where l is the number of arguments of f1. However, the general case can be reduced
notationally to the single-sequence case [14, p. 164].
It must be stressed that the number∞ does not denote an unknown or varying cardinal-
ity. The cardinality ∞ is not unknown to us in the sense that over the course of specifying
the value of ∞ more and more precisely, we might come to know that ∞ denotes a finite
cardinality.
The numbers ∞i can be proved to be greater than any standard natural number:
(47)(∀n)(0 < s(n))
and
(48)∞i+j = s(∞i+j+1)
hold trivially. We conclude
(49)0 <∞i+j
from (47) and (48). (49) and the theorem
(50)(∀x)(x < y ⊂ s(x) < s(y))
give rise to
(51)sj (0) < sj (∞i+j ).
Because by definition,
(52)sj (∞i+j )=∞i ,
it can be concluded that
(53)sj (0) <∞i .
It is important to acknowledge the philosophical contribution that is brought about by
the nonstandard natural number ∞. In constructive logic, the meaning of propositions is
explained by telling what their canonical proofs would look like. In type theory, these
proofs are coded by proof-objects. But what would count as proof for an empirical propo-
sition? The universal quantification, in particular, presents a problem since in general it is
12 Here the words ‘for some’ must naturally be understood intuitionistically.
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held that when the domain has no upper bound, it is not possible to prove or verify a factual
universal generalization. Indeed, nothing can count as a verification of such a proposition.
Typical examples are scientific laws, which are often intended to hold for an infinite num-
ber of instances, or more generally, universal quantifications over infinite data streams.
The problem arises: how to devise a meaning explanation for empirical universal quantifi-
cations that would comply with the general constructivistic meaning explanation for the
logical constants? By denoting the cardinality of the individual domain by ∞ and adopting
the interpretation given for ∞ above we can resolve this problem since in this case we
only need to provide meaning explanations for propositions in finite domains denoted by
standard natural numbers.
7.2. Why truth-valued sentences?
We introduce the abbreviations
True(x)= Id(Bool, x, true) : prop (x : Bool),
(54)False(x)= Id(Bool, x, false) : prop (x : Bool).
The sentences of CS are defined as elements of the set of truth values (Bool). The pos-
sibility of doing this constructively derives from the principles of formalization we have
adopted. But why could we not adhere to the stock of logical constants operating on propo-
sitions that we already have in type theory? Why do we have to define expressions like
A∧B : Bool instead of directly stating True(A)& True(B) : prop?
One reason pertains to the definitions of quantifiers. In the case of lawless sequences,
there is no other generally applicable method of finding out the truth value of a quantifier
sentence than examining its instances one by one. To be more exact: in the general case,
one can prove a universally quantified sentence and falsify an existentially quantified one
only by going through all instances of them.
It is possible to do the checking manually, and infer, when the upper limit of the quan-
tification is reached, that the proposition in question is true or false. However, in the case of
big substitution classes (e.g., a lot of empirical data), computerized evaluation is handier.
In addition to Π and Σ , it is thus useful to define truth-valued quantifiers which serve as
methods of checking their own truth values.
Since we want to be able to form compound sentences with occurrences of quantifiers
and logical connectives or modal operators, this applies to all operators. For example, a
sentence like
(55)(∃x)(P(x)∧ R(x))
is well-formed only if both ‘∧’ and ‘’ are also defined as truth-valued functions.
Another reason to adopt Boolean-valued sentences is that when sentences are given as
truth values, many theorems of classical (modal) logic are provable with less effort than
they would be otherwise since the law of excluded middle
(56)True(A)∨ False(A)
comes out as an easy corollary (see, e.g., [18, pp. 113–114]).
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7.3. The logical spaceThe state descriptions are formalized as contexts by using the variable n for the cardi-
nality (the number of individuals involved) and variables w1, . . . ,wl for each predicate to
determine the truth values of sentences. The predicate variables w1, . . . ,wl denote combi-
nations of sequences of canonical injections i and j , which are capable of conveying the
same information as binary sequences of 0’s and 1’s. The length of each sequence is partly
determined by the cardinality variable n, partly by the arity of the predicate in question.
For example, the length of a sequence representing a monadic predicate is n digits. In the
case of a single monadic predicate, the logical space is represented by the context
(57)n :N, w :B(n).13
In (57), B is a family of sets, defined by means of universes, which satisfies the equa-
tions
B(0)=,
(58)B(s(n))= B(n)+B(n).
Let us consider an example. Suppose the value of the variable n in Eqs. (58) is 1; then
the elements of the resulting set B(2) are the sequences i(i(01)), i(j (01)), j (i(01)) and
j (j (01)), where 01 is the only element of the set .
In the general case, when the language may contain predicates of an arbitrary arity, the
situation becomes more complicated. Now the formalization is provided by conjunctions
of sequences of i’s and j ’s. A m-place predicate is represented by a variable of the type
C(m− 1, n), which satisfies the equations
C(0, n)= B(n),
(59)C(s(y), n)= C(y,n)& · · ·&C(y,n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
.
The idea is that the sets C(y,n) consist of layers of conjunctions of B(n)’s (if x = 0),
and each series of conjunctions like in (59) corresponds to the set of n possible values
of a variable in the atomic predicate so that C(0, n) corresponds to the n possible values
of the last individual variable in the predicate. C(y,n) is thus a conjunction consisting of
altogether ny elementary conjuncts of the form B(n). Each canonical injection in these
B(n)’s provides an answer to the question whether the atomic sentence with certain in-
dividual constants is true or false. To demonstrate how (59) works, let us formalize the
logical space for a dyadic atomic predicate and a domain of two individuals:
(60)C(1,2)= B(2)&B(2).
Provided that we are given an element of the set (60), we can compute the value of any
atomic sentence which is an instance of the predicate coded by (60). If the first individual
13 The idea to represent Carnapian state descriptions with the set B dates back to a presentation by Aarne Ranta
at the 1992 Finnish–Russian logic symposium.
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constant in the atomic sentence is the first constant of the language, the sentence gets
its value from the left conjunct of (60), otherwise from the right conjunct. If the second
individual constant in the sentence is the first constant of the language, the truth value of
the sentence is determined by the first canonical injection from the conjunct which was
determined by the first constant occurring in the sentence.
The logical space defined by Eqs. (58) and (59) is in a sense potentially infinite. The
value of n in (58) can be given by setting n = s(n1), where n1 :N , and hence simultane-
ously introducing a new variable n1. In a situation like this it is declared that the value of
n is at least 1 but left unspecified whether it is exactly 1 or bigger than 1. These kinds of
partial substitutions can be repeated infinitely, but of course the value of n or one of the
variables ni can also be given at once—the process of substituting values is not necessarily
endless.
In the monadic one-predicate case, the space of infinite state descriptions satisfies the
following equalities:
(61)B(∞)= B(s(∞1)
)= B(∞1)+B(∞1)= B
(
s(∞2)
)+B(s(∞2)
)= · · · .
The approximations of B(∞) are of the form
(62)d(yi) :B
(
si(xi)
) (
xi :N, y :B(xi)
)
,
where d is a sequence of canonical injections i and j of length i.
7.4. The atomic predicates
One may include in CS all decidable atomic properties and relations between natural
numbers, for instance, equality or smaller-than:
eq(x, y) : Bool (x :N,y :N),
(63)smaller(x, y) : Bool (x :N,y :N).
To define atomic matrices, we need the proposition C∗, which is defined in such a way
that it satisfies the following conditions:
C∗(0,m,n)= B(n),
C∗
(
s(y),0, n
)=,
(64)C∗(s(y), s(z), n)= C∗(y,n,n)&C∗(s(y), z, n).
Every “qualitative” atomic predicate (i.e., predicate whose obtaining or not-obtaining is
not merely a question of which individual constants are involved; cf. [2, p. 76]) of arity m
can be represented by a function of the form
(65)atomm(m− 1,a1...m,p1...m,wk) : Bool,
where wk :C∗(m − 1, n,n) = C∗∗(m − 1, n) (wk is an element of the logical space for
the kth atomic predicate), a1...m = a1, . . . , am are natural numbers which denote individ-
ual constants (positions) and pa1...m = pa1, . . . , pam are proof-objects for the condition(s)
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that a1...m < n, i.e., that the individual constants belong to the substitution class with the
cardinality n.14
(65) satisfies the equations below, where l and r denote the left and right projection
functions, respectively, s(z) n, and f (ps(x)) : (x < z) under the assumption ps(x) : s(x) <
s(z):
atomy+2
(
s(y), s(x),a2...(y+2), ps(x),pa2...(y+2) ,w
)
= atomy+2
(
s(y), x,a2...(y+2), f (ps(x)),pa2...(y+2) , r(w)
) (
w :C∗
(
s(y), s(z), n
))
,
atomy+2
(
s(y),0,a2...(y+2), p0,pa2...(y+2) ,w
)
= atomy+1
(
y,a2...(y+2),pa2...(y+2) , l(w)
) (
w :C∗
(
s(y), s(z), n
))
,
(66)atom1(0, a,pa,w)= true/false
(
w :B(n)
)
.
To present an example, the truth value of a two-variable atomic sentence atom2(1,1,2,
p1,p2,wk) would be computed in the following way:
atom2(1,1,2,p1,p2,wk)= atom2
(
1,0,2, f (p1),p2, r(wk)
)
(67)= atom1
(
0,2,p2, l
(
r(wk)
))= true/false.
7.5. The quantifiers
Now we will proceed to look at how to construct compound expressions from atomic
sentences and matrices. Sentential connectives can be defined in the usual truth-functional
manner, but the quantifier case is somewhat more difficult.
In type theory, functional quantifiers cannot operate in expressions that are themselves
computable to true or false since such expressions cannot contain bindable variables. In-
stead, they have to be defined over matrices of the general form
(68)Sent(n)= (Πt :N)(Πp : t < n)Bool : set (n :N),
which compute to a truth value when applied to a natural number and a proof that the
number belongs to the substitution class.
In general, quantification could start from any individual constant and proceed to higher
ones. To be able to substitute the first individual in the expression of the type Sent(n), one
must be able to prove that the index of the individual is smaller than n (the indices begin
from 0). Hence, to be able to begin with the first individual, we must explicitly assume
that there is at least one individual constant (i.e., that 0 is smaller than n); however, this
assumption can be dispensed with if we put n = s(n1) (in the sequel, n1 is replaced by
n for reasons of convenience). A lazily computable existential quantifier is defined in the
following way:
(69)unionsq(n,m) : Bool (n :N, m : Sent(n)).
14 We first define a Bool-valued function smaller(x, y) and then state that x < y = Id(Bool, smaller(x, y),
true).
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The universal quantifier is obtained by negation from (69):
(n,m)=unionsq(n, (λt)(λp)∼ Apply(Apply(m, t),p) : Bool.
(70)(n :N, m : Sent(n)).
Calling (69) and (70) lazily computable means that they are given in such a way that
they can be computed even if the value of n is not a closed term of type theory, i.e., if
n=∞ or n= si (xi) for some i. For example,
unionsq(∞,m)= unionsq(s(∞1),m
)
(71)= Apply(m,0)∨unionsq(∞1, g(m)
)
,
where g(m) is a matrix similar to m but adds one to every index to which m is applied.
Hence, a universally quantified sentence may sometimes compute to false and an existen-
tially quantified one to true even if the domain of individuals is infinite or not completely
known.
7.6. The modal operators
Since for every individual constant x occurring in a sentence it can be proved that
x  hind , where hind is the highest index of individual constants occurring in the sentence
(beginning from 0 and hind = 0 if there are no individual constants in the sentence), any
CS-sentence can be presented in the form
(72)S(hind, n,w) : Bool
(
n :N, m :N, hind :N, w : C∗∗
(
m− 1, hind + s(n)
))
,
where w : C∗∗(m − 1, hind + s(n)) is an abbreviation for the sequence w1 :C∗∗(m1 − 1,
hind + s(n)), . . . ,wj :C∗∗(mj − 1, hind + s(n)) corresponding to the atomic predicates of
the language. The inputs for modal operators are thus tentatively of the type
Mod(m, hind)= (Πn :N)
(
Πw : C∗∗
(
m− 1, hind + s(n)
))
: set
(73)(m :N, hind :N).
In this formalization, the possibility operator takes the form
(74)Poss(n,m, hind, u) : Bool
(
n :N, m :N, hind :N, u : Mod(m, hind)
)
.
Poss(n,m, hind, u) can be given a type-theoretical definition which computes to a disjunc-
tion consisting of applications of u to all state descriptions between the smallest one and n.
The necessity operator can be defined as a non-possibility of negation:
Nec(n,m, hind, u)=∼ Poss
(
n,m, hind, (λn)(λwk)
∼ Apply(Apply(u,n),wk)
))
: Bool
(75)(n :N, m :N, hind :N, u : Mod(m, hind)
)
.
However, the definitions (74) and (75) are still inadequate for the purposes of quantified
modal logic.
First, (74) and (75) do not yet capture the meaning of logical modalities since they con-
tain an open variable n denoting the biggest cardinality over which they quantify. Since
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there is no upper limit for the cardinalities that we need to take into account when consid-
ering the logical possibility of a sentence, the value of n cannot be fixed to any standard
natural number.
Second, they do not allow the substitution of sentential matrices for u, which means that
quantifying in modal contexts is not allowed. In the following, we will show that these two
limitations can be overcome.
Due to decidability of judgements, functional expressions in Martin-Löf’s standard type
theory are computable. Since the logical possibility of a sentence is not decidable, the
modal operators cannot be defined as functions of standard type theory. Instead, we must
employ the notion of the nonstandard object of the nonstandard type theory introduced in
Section 7.1. We shall represent logical modalities by using the infinite nonstandard natural
number ∞:
Poss∞(m, hind, u)= Poss(m, hind,∞, u) : Bool
(76)(m :N, hind :N, u : Mod(m, hind)
)
.
Let us show by a simple example how (76) is computed. In the example, the logical
space represents just one monadic predicate, and there is at most one individual constant
in the sentence.
Poss∞(0,0, u)= Posss(∞1)(0,0, u)
= (Apply(Apply(u,0), i(01)
)∨ Apply(Apply(u,0), j (01)
))
(77)∨ Poss∞1(0,0, f (u)) (u : Mod(1,0)),
where f (u)= (λn)(λw)(Apply(Apply(u, s(n)), i(w))∨ Apply(Apply(u, s(n)), j (w))).
To overcome the second limitation mentioned above, i.e., to be able to express quantifi-
cation in modal contexts, we must alter the definition of (73) to:
Modgen(m, t, hind)= (Πn :N)
(
Πp :
(
t < hind + s(n)
))
(
Πw : C∗∗
(
m− 1, hind + s(n)
))
(78)(m :N, t :N, hind :N).
We can now see that there is an infinite number of types of expressions which are valid
inputs for modal operators since there can be any number of free individual variables in t
and any number of variables in w denoting the atomic predicates occurring in u. There is
thus an infinite number of modal operators (which could be collected under a more general
operator by using an additional argument to denote the number of free individual variables
in the input of the operator). This complication cannot be avoided. All the atomic predicates
could be represented (although somewhat artificially) with just a single binary sequence,
but also in this case there can be any number of individual variables in t. The situation
would be the same if we decided to formalize modal operators in the propositional level of
type theory because we have to be prepared to bind the whole vector p : (t< hind + s(n)).
The modal operators that take expressions of the type (78) as input are of the following
form:
(79)Poss∞gen(t,m, hind, u) : Bool
(
t : N, m :N, hind :N, u : Modgen(m, t, hind)
)
,
(80)Nec∞gen(t,m, hind, u) : Bool
(
t :N, m :N, hind :N, u : Modgen(m, t, hind)
)
.
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In (79) and (80), t is a sequence of free individual variables. The smallest cardinal-
ity over which the operators quantify is max(hind, t) + 1 :N (the first individual con-
stant is 0)—otherwise one of t would not have an interpretation and a proof of t <
max(hind, t)+ 1 would not be possible.15
7.7. Abbreviations
Since the above notation is rather complicated to apply in practice, a few abbreviations
become handy.
We introduce the following convention to denote a sentential matrix:
(81)(λt)(λp)P (p, t) = Pp,t : Sent(n) (n :N).
Quantifiers can now be written as
unionsq(n,Pp,t )= (unionsqt < n)Pp,t ,
(82)(n,Pp,t )= (t < n)Pp,t .
We abbreviate the functional arguments of the modal operators as follows:
(λn)(λw)S(hind, n,w)= Shind ,
(83)(λn)(λp)(λw)M(hind, n,p, t,w)=Mhind,t.
Employing (83), we introduce the following conventions for the modal operators:
Poss∞
(
m, hind, S
hind
)= Shind ,
Nec∞gen
(
t,m, hind, Shind
)=✷Shind ,
Poss∞gen
(
t,m, hind,Mhind,t
)= Mhind,t,
(84)Nec∞gen
(
t,m, hind,Mhind,t
)=✷Mhind,t.
We present an example of a modal sentence in CS. The Barcan formula (∃t)M(t) ⊃
(∃t) M(t) of ordinary modal predicate calculus becomes
(85)((unionsqt < n)Mp,t (hind, n,p, t,w)
)hind,t ⊃ (unionsqt < n)(Mhind,t)
p,t
: Bool.
Observe that (85) does not depend on any free state description variable.
The Barcan formula as formalized above is not valid in CS. However, further discussions
about this issue must be postponed to another paper.
15 The explicit type-theoretical definition of the possibility operator includes a proof for each free variable ti
in t that ti < (max(hind, . . . , ti , . . .)+ 1), i.e., that ti has an interpretation in the smallest cardinality over which
Poss∞gen quantifies. If ti has an interpretation in this cardinality, the corresponding proof is also easy to construct
for any larger cardinality over which Poss∞gen quantifies since for every t and x it holds that t < s(x) if it holds
that t < x.
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7.8. Justifying the modal operatorsIt remains to show that (79) and (80) are justified as explications of logical modalities.
Satisfiability and validity for an arbitrary sentence S of CS can be expressed by the
propositions
(86)(∃n :N)(∃w : C∗∗(m− 1, n))True(S(hind, n,w)
)
and
(87)(∀n :N)(∀w : C∗∗(m− 1, n))True(S(hind, n,w)
)
.
If the proposition
(88)True(Shind )
is true, the proposition
(89)True(Possgen
(
si (xi),m, hind, S
hind
))
is true in standard type theory for some i . From (89), one can derive that
(90)(∃n :N)(∃w : C∗∗(m− 1, n))True(S(hind, n,w)
)
is true,16 which proves one direction of the required result.
Assume now that (90) is true and that
(91)False(Shind )
is true. From (91), we get that
(92)(∀n :N)(∀w : C∗∗(m− 1, n))False(S(hind, n,w)
)
is true for every n,17 which is in contradiction to (90). We then negate assumption (91) and
get (88), which proves the other direction of the desired result.
The proof for the necessity operator is now trivial. Assume that
(93)True(✷Shind )
is true, from which it follows that
(94)False( ∼ Shind )
is true. (94) leads to
(95)(∀n :N)(∀w : C∗∗(m− 1, n))False(∼ S(hind, n,w)
)
,
which is equivalent to
(96)(∀n :N)(∀w : C∗∗(m− 1, n))True(S(hind, n,w)
)
.
16 A computer-checked proof of this has been constructed only for a monadic version of the calculus CS, but it
can be extended to cover also CS.
17 This result has also been proved with ALF for a monadic version of CS.
R. Holm / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 13–46 45
To prove the other direction, we first assume that (96) and
(97)False(✷Shind )
are true. From (97), we get that
True
( ∼ Shind )
is true, which yields the truth of
(98)(∃n :N)(∃w : C∗∗(m− 1, n))True(∼ S(hind, n,w)
)
.
On the other hand, (98) is in contradiction to (96), from which we infer that
True
(✷Shind )
is true.
8. Conclusions
This article has discussed the difficulties involved in the formalization of modal logic
and especially constructive modal logic.
It has been shown that the solution to the difficulties involved in quantification in modal
contexts presented in Section 5.2 calls for a type-theoretical approach where propositions
are defined by their proof-objects.
A solution to the problem concerning the totality of logically possible worlds was pre-
sented by means of lawless binary sequences. It was argued that these kinds of sequences
are the most natural way to represent the possible states of affairs.
The drawback of this approach is that reasoning about possible states of affairs and
about quantificational sentences of rule-determined infinite structures cannot be studied in
the same framework of possible worlds semantics. This is also true of the quantificational
sentences of arithmetic: they cannot be interpreted in the standard way in the calculus CS,
since the set of natural numbers is not one of possible domains in the framework of CS.
The above means that in the present approach, reasoning about possible worlds and
about “mental” entities (like the set N ) must be kept apart from each other. On the
other hand, one could argue that possible worlds as contingent states of affairs and rule-
determined sets like N really are different kinds of entities. Possible states of affairs
introduce a different concept of possible world than what is involved in the standard in-
terpretation of arithmetic in the set of natural numbers, and what we mean by a possible
world has, in turn, a certain influence on the interpretation of quantifiers. We can construc-
tively justify many of the classical logical truths of first-order predicate logic, if quantifiers
are interpreted in the domain of choice sequences, as is done in the calculus CS.
Besides being an explication of constructive logical modalities, the calculus CS lays a
foundation for future work in state description semantics, viz., the formalization of induc-
tive logic. For instance, the possibility to extend language by adding new variables of type
C∗∗(m − 1, n) (see Section 7.3) enables representing changes in our conceptual frame-
work. This kind of approach can be more relevant in the analysis of scientific thought
46 R. Holm / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 13–46
than the customary static conception of formal language with its fixed set of atomic pred-
icates. Nonstandard type theory with its infinitely proceeding sequences thus creates new
prospects for the program of inductive logic.
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